Abstract
The coupling between cyber and physical components makes cyber-security an area of growing interest in the power industry. Sensing, communications, and intelligent control technologies are being integrated with field devices, changing the traditional structure of power systems and transforming power infrastructure into a more interactive, dynamic and controllable system. As a result, the developed smart grid environment increases the chances of being maliciously attacked. Monitoring and control decision equipment such as microprocessor-based protection relays, offer an ideal exploitation candidate for attackers. This paper presents how an adversary is able to disrupt the operation of Circuit Breakers (CBs) by injecting malicious tripping commands to the relay controller. We formulate an attack strategy by reverse engineering the firmware of an existing commercial protection relay. The impact of the developed attacks is studied on the IEEE 14 bus test case system.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015 |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| Pages | 283-288 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781467382892 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 17 2016 |
| Event | IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015 - Miami, United States Duration: Nov 1 2015 → Nov 5 2015 |
Other
| Other | IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Miami |
| Period | 11/1/15 → 11/5/15 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Energy Engineering and Power Technology
- Computer Networks and Communications
Cite this
Impact of firmware modification attacks on power systems field devices. / Konstantinou, Charalambos; Maniatakos, Mihalis.
2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 283-288 7436314.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Impact of firmware modification attacks on power systems field devices
AU - Konstantinou, Charalambos
AU - Maniatakos, Mihalis
PY - 2016/3/17
Y1 - 2016/3/17
N2 - The coupling between cyber and physical components makes cyber-security an area of growing interest in the power industry. Sensing, communications, and intelligent control technologies are being integrated with field devices, changing the traditional structure of power systems and transforming power infrastructure into a more interactive, dynamic and controllable system. As a result, the developed smart grid environment increases the chances of being maliciously attacked. Monitoring and control decision equipment such as microprocessor-based protection relays, offer an ideal exploitation candidate for attackers. This paper presents how an adversary is able to disrupt the operation of Circuit Breakers (CBs) by injecting malicious tripping commands to the relay controller. We formulate an attack strategy by reverse engineering the firmware of an existing commercial protection relay. The impact of the developed attacks is studied on the IEEE 14 bus test case system.
AB - The coupling between cyber and physical components makes cyber-security an area of growing interest in the power industry. Sensing, communications, and intelligent control technologies are being integrated with field devices, changing the traditional structure of power systems and transforming power infrastructure into a more interactive, dynamic and controllable system. As a result, the developed smart grid environment increases the chances of being maliciously attacked. Monitoring and control decision equipment such as microprocessor-based protection relays, offer an ideal exploitation candidate for attackers. This paper presents how an adversary is able to disrupt the operation of Circuit Breakers (CBs) by injecting malicious tripping commands to the relay controller. We formulate an attack strategy by reverse engineering the firmware of an existing commercial protection relay. The impact of the developed attacks is studied on the IEEE 14 bus test case system.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84964999285&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2015.7436314
DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2015.7436314
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84964999285
SP - 283
EP - 288
BT - 2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -