Imitation and luck

An experimental study on social sampling

Theo Offerman, Andrew Schotter

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In this paper, we present the results of two experiments on social sampling, where people make a risky decision after they have sampled the behavior of others who have done exactly the same problem before them. In an individual decision making problem as well as in the takeover game, the simple behavioral rule of imitating the best appears to be a robust description of behavior despite the fact that it is not optimal in any of the experimental tasks. Social sampling makes people look more risk seeking than the people who do not have the opportunity to sample.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)461-502
    Number of pages42
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume65
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 2009

    Fingerprint

    Experimental study
    Luck
    Imitation
    Sampling
    Risky decisions
    Individual decision making
    Risk seeking
    Experiment

    Keywords

    • Experiment
    • Risk
    • Social learning

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Imitation and luck : An experimental study on social sampling. / Offerman, Theo; Schotter, Andrew.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 65, No. 2, 03.2009, p. 461-502.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Offerman, Theo ; Schotter, Andrew. / Imitation and luck : An experimental study on social sampling. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2009 ; Vol. 65, No. 2. pp. 461-502.
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