Hybrid mean field game dynamics in large population

Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    We consider finite populations of interacting players with different types and finite action set per type. Under suitable conditions we derive the mean field game dynamics which can be deterministic or stochastic depending on how the system behave with the time-scales. Connection between mean field game dynamics and evolutionary game dynamics are established. Considering different revision protocols for each player, we derive an hybrid mean field game dynamics which offers the possibility of elimination of non-Nash rest points and give nice convergence properties in potential games and stable games.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011
    Pages5109-5114
    Number of pages6
    StatePublished - Sep 29 2011
    Event2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011 - San Francisco, CA, United States
    Duration: Jun 29 2011Jul 1 2011

    Other

    Other2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011
    CountryUnited States
    CitySan Francisco, CA
    Period6/29/117/1/11

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    Cite this

    Hamidou, T. (2011). Hybrid mean field game dynamics in large population. In Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011 (pp. 5109-5114). [5990794]

    Hybrid mean field game dynamics in large population. / Hamidou, Tembine.

    Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011. 2011. p. 5109-5114 5990794.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Hamidou, T 2011, Hybrid mean field game dynamics in large population. in Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011., 5990794, pp. 5109-5114, 2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011, San Francisco, CA, United States, 6/29/11.
    Hamidou T. Hybrid mean field game dynamics in large population. In Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011. 2011. p. 5109-5114. 5990794
    Hamidou, Tembine. / Hybrid mean field game dynamics in large population. Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference, ACC 2011. 2011. pp. 5109-5114
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