HOW TO BE SOPHISTICATED, LIE, CHEAT, BLUFF AND WIN AT POLITICS

MICHAEL LAVER

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Abstract. This paper presents an informal argument about the relationship between strategic interaction and‘economic’theories of political processes. It is concerned with interactions between small groups of rational actors, in which each knows the preferences of the others and is attempting to get the better of the others. In these circumstances, the outcome is usually determined by the strategic interaction involved and is often, therefore, rather unstable. Since formal models in themselves do not help us very much to interpret the processes involved, the bulk of the paper is concerned with an analysis of various aspects of strategic interaction. These include being sophisticated, lying, cheating and bluffing.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)462-473
    Number of pages12
    JournalPolitical Studies
    Volume26
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1978

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

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