How robust is laboratory gift exchange?

Gary Charness, Guillaume Frechette, John H. Kagel

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change-whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)189-205
    Number of pages17
    JournalExperimental Economics
    Volume7
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 2004

    Fingerprint

    Gift exchange
    Time trends
    Prisoners' dilemma

    Keywords

    • Framing
    • Gift exchange
    • Robustness

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    How robust is laboratory gift exchange? / Charness, Gary; Frechette, Guillaume; Kagel, John H.

    In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 06.2004, p. 189-205.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Charness, G, Frechette, G & Kagel, JH 2004, 'How robust is laboratory gift exchange?', Experimental Economics, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 189-205. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026979.14590.3c
    Charness, Gary ; Frechette, Guillaume ; Kagel, John H. / How robust is laboratory gift exchange?. In: Experimental Economics. 2004 ; Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 189-205.
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