Guarding the Guardians

Legislative self-policing and electoral corruption in Victorian Britain

Andrew C. Eggers, Arthur Spirling

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We offer an institutional explanation for the dramatic decline in corrupt practices that characterizes British political development in the mass suffrage era. Parliamentary candidates who faced corruption charges were judged by tribunals of sitting MPs until 1868, when this responsibility was passed to the courts. We draw on theory and empirical evidence to demonstrate that delegating responsibility over corruption trials to judges was an important institutional step in cleaning up elections. By focusing on an institutional explanation for Victorian electoral corruption (and its demise), we provide an account that complements the existing literature while offering clearer implications for contemporary policy debates.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)337-370
    Number of pages34
    JournalQuarterly Journal of Political Science
    Volume9
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2014

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    corruption
    suffrage
    responsibility
    political development
    candidacy
    election
    evidence
    literature

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Guarding the Guardians : Legislative self-policing and electoral corruption in Victorian Britain. / Eggers, Andrew C.; Spirling, Arthur.

    In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2014, p. 337-370.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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