Group stability in matching with interdependent values

Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and imperfect information held by one side of the market. The other side has common and known preferences over potential mates. In this setting, pairwise stability does not imply group stability: mechanisms that are stable with respect to deviations by pairs of agents may be vulnerable to deviations by groups. We formalize a notion of group stability and construct a “modified serial dictatorship” mechanism that implements group stable matchings. We further discuss the robustness of our notion of stability and examine efficiency properties of modified serial dictatorship.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3-24
Number of pages22
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume19
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

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Keywords

  • Group stability
  • Interdependent values
  • Modified serial dictatorship

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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