Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism

José Antonio Cheibub, Adam Przeworski, Sebastian M. Saiegh

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? Do legislative deadlocks occur when presidents do not form majoritarian governments? Are presidential democracies more brittle when they are ruled by minorities? We answer these questions observing almost all democracies that existed between 1946 and 1999. It turns out that government coalitions occur in more than one half of the situations in which the president's party does not have a majority, that minority governments are not less successful legislatively than majority coalitions in both systems, and that the coalition status of the government has no impact on the survival of democracy in either system. Hence, whatever is wrong with presidentialism, is not due to the difficulty of forming coalitions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)565-587
    Number of pages23
    JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
    Volume34
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 2004

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    parliamentarism
    coalition
    democracy
    president
    minority

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. / Cheibub, José Antonio; Przeworski, Adam; Saiegh, Sebastian M.

    In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 4, 10.2004, p. 565-587.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Cheibub, José Antonio ; Przeworski, Adam ; Saiegh, Sebastian M. / Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. In: British Journal of Political Science. 2004 ; Vol. 34, No. 4. pp. 565-587.
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