Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations

S. Matthew Liao, Jordan Mackenzie

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

Abstract

In “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. We doubt, however, whether the principle of rescue can ground a duty to warn in the cases Kilbride envisages, and we suggest that Kilbride may have underappreciated the role that special obligations could play in generating a duty to warn family members.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)18-19
Number of pages2
JournalHastings Center Report
Volume48
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2018

Fingerprint

Duty to Warn
family member
obligation
Genetic Privacy
privacy
Disease
Costs and Cost Analysis
human being
costs
Rescue
Obligation
Genetic Information

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health(social science)
  • Issues, ethics and legal aspects
  • Philosophy
  • Health Policy

Cite this

Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations. / Liao, S. Matthew; Mackenzie, Jordan.

In: Hastings Center Report, Vol. 48, No. 3, 01.05.2018, p. 18-19.

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

@article{4a573a6f21f04ec6a62a6de6e97b4b77,
title = "Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations",
abstract = "In “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. We doubt, however, whether the principle of rescue can ground a duty to warn in the cases Kilbride envisages, and we suggest that Kilbride may have underappreciated the role that special obligations could play in generating a duty to warn family members.",
author = "Liao, {S. Matthew} and Jordan Mackenzie",
year = "2018",
month = "5",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1002/hast.850",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "48",
pages = "18--19",
journal = "Hastings Center Report",
issn = "0093-0334",
publisher = "Hastings Center",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations

AU - Liao, S. Matthew

AU - Mackenzie, Jordan

PY - 2018/5/1

Y1 - 2018/5/1

N2 - In “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. We doubt, however, whether the principle of rescue can ground a duty to warn in the cases Kilbride envisages, and we suggest that Kilbride may have underappreciated the role that special obligations could play in generating a duty to warn family members.

AB - In “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. We doubt, however, whether the principle of rescue can ground a duty to warn in the cases Kilbride envisages, and we suggest that Kilbride may have underappreciated the role that special obligations could play in generating a duty to warn family members.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85047663874&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85047663874&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1002/hast.850

DO - 10.1002/hast.850

M3 - Comment/debate

VL - 48

SP - 18

EP - 19

JO - Hastings Center Report

JF - Hastings Center Report

SN - 0093-0334

IS - 3

ER -