Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees

Salvador Barberà, Faruk Gul, Ennio Stacchetti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We define a multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a single-peaked domain is a generalized median voter scheme. Since a single-peaked preference can be identified unequivocally with its bliss point, one can view a social choice function as an Arrowian social welfare function. We show that a social choice function is strategy-proof iff, viewed as a social welfare function, it satisfies a monotonicity property. Finally, we investigate strategic decision making in hierarchical committees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)262-289
    Number of pages28
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume61
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1993

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    Social choice function
    Median voter
    Strategy-proof
    Social welfare function
    Single-peaked preferences
    Economics
    Monotonicity
    Strategic decision making

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees. / Barberà, Salvador; Gul, Faruk; Stacchetti, Ennio.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 61, No. 2, 12.1993, p. 262-289.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Barberà, S, Gul, F & Stacchetti, E 1993, 'Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 262-289. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1069
    Barberà, Salvador ; Gul, Faruk ; Stacchetti, Ennio. / Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1993 ; Vol. 61, No. 2. pp. 262-289.
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