Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

Guillaume Frechette, John H. Kagel, Massimo Morelli

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We compare Gamson's Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two non-cooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does Gamson's Law. We also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non-cooperative bargaining models. Namely, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under the Baron-Ferejohn model, and a significant number of bargaining rounds tend to take more than two steps under demand bargaining and more than one stage under Baron-Ferejohn, counter to the models' predictions. Regressions using the experimental data provide results similar to the field data, but fail to do so once one accounts for predictions regarding coalition composition under Gamson's Law.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)365-390
    Number of pages26
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume51
    Issue number2 SPEC. ISS.
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 2005

    Fingerprint

    Bargaining theory
    Bargaining model
    Prediction
    Noncooperative bargaining
    Bargaining power
    Comparative statics
    Vote
    Deviation
    Empirical model
    Game-theoretic models
    Prediction model
    Legislative bargaining

    Keywords

    • Baron-Ferejohn
    • Demand bargaining
    • Gamson's Law
    • Legislative bargaining
    • Nominal bargaining power

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Frechette, G., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005). Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2 SPEC. ISS.), 365-390. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.003

    Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory. / Frechette, Guillaume; Kagel, John H.; Morelli, Massimo.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 51, No. 2 SPEC. ISS., 05.2005, p. 365-390.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Frechette, G, Kagel, JH & Morelli, M 2005, 'Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 51, no. 2 SPEC. ISS., pp. 365-390. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.003
    Frechette, Guillaume ; Kagel, John H. ; Morelli, Massimo. / Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2005 ; Vol. 51, No. 2 SPEC. ISS. pp. 365-390.
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