Game theory, information, and deliberative democracy

Dimitri Landa, Adam Meirowitz

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We contend that, with a suitably broad notion of rationality and a diverse set of motivations, the game-theoretic tradition is particularly well suited for generating insights about effects of deliberative institutions and that progress in the development of deliberative democratic theory hinges on making proper sense of the relationship between game-theoretic and normative theoretic approaches to deliberation. To advance this view, we explore the central methodological issues at the core of that relationship and address the arguments raised against the relevance of game-theoretic work on deliberation. We develop a framework for thinking about the differences in how the normative and the game-theoretic approaches frame and answer questions about deliberation and articulate an approach to a deliberative democratic theory that builds on the strengths of both of these theoretic traditions, properly informed by empirical scholarship.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)427-444
    Number of pages18
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    Volume53
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 2009

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    deliberative democracy
    game theory
    deliberation
    rationality

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Game theory, information, and deliberative democracy. / Landa, Dimitri; Meirowitz, Adam.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 2, 04.2009, p. 427-444.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Landa, Dimitri ; Meirowitz, Adam. / Game theory, information, and deliberative democracy. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2009 ; Vol. 53, No. 2. pp. 427-444.
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