Game theoretic approaches for highway infrastructure protection against sea level rise

Co-opetition among multiple players

Ilia Papakonstantinou, Jinwoo Lee, Samer Madanat

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This research investigates the influence of decision-maker behavior on policies that may be adopted for the protection of highway infrastructure against inundations resulting from sea-level rise. We develop an integrated game-theoretical decision-making framework to represent multiple co-opetitive decision-makers’ behavior and use the San Francisco Bay Area shoreline with a scenario of a 0.5 m sea-level rise as a numerical simulation study. The decision-makers’ objective is to minimize the traffic delay caused by inundations in the transportation network that lies within their geographical boundaries. Each decision-maker should determine where to build levees either only along their shoreline without cooperation or along a shared shoreline within a coalition. In this framework, each competitive decision-maker can consider cooperation to minimize its traffic delay, so its behavior can be defined as co-opetitive. We define necessary conditions for forming coalitions for multiple co-opetitive decision-makers, as well as cost-distributing rules and incentive negotiation processes within each coalition. Our model considers the effects of hydrodynamic interactions, traffic flow patterns changes as a result of inundations, and budget constraints on the costs of seashore protection. The hydrodynamics in the Bay Area are affected by the shoreline protection strategy, and closure of a highway link in one county affects traffic delays in other counties due to traffic re-routing. Thus, protection decisions made by a county have potential impacts on several other counties, and therefore counties must consider other counties’ actions. In the numerical study, we investigate the results of co-opetitive games for a range of funding scenarios. It is shown, through examples, that cooperation among counties decreases the additional delay for all participants in most cases compared to competition-only cases. In some cases, cooperation also reduces protection costs.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)21-37
    Number of pages17
    JournalTransportation Research Part B: Methodological
    Volume123
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 1 2019

    Fingerprint

    Sea level
    decision maker
    infrastructure
    traffic
    Hydrodynamics
    Costs
    coalition
    Levees
    Flow patterns
    Coastal zones
    costs
    Decision making
    scenario
    Computer simulation
    budget
    funding
    incentive
    decision making
    simulation
    interaction

    Keywords

    • Co-opetitive game
    • Game theoretic approaches
    • Highway infrastructure protection
    • Incentive
    • Multiple decision-makers
    • Negotiation
    • Sea-level rise
    • Transportation networks

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Civil and Structural Engineering
    • Transportation

    Cite this

    Game theoretic approaches for highway infrastructure protection against sea level rise : Co-opetition among multiple players. / Papakonstantinou, Ilia; Lee, Jinwoo; Madanat, Samer.

    In: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Vol. 123, 01.05.2019, p. 21-37.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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