Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks

Quanyan Zhu, Linda Bushnell, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Wireless sensor networks are subject to attacks such as node capture and cloning, where an attacker physically captures sensor nodes, replicates the nodes, which are deployed into the network, and proceeds to take over the network. In this paper, we develop models for such an attack when there are multiple attackers in a network, and formulate multi-player games to model the noncooperative strategic behavior between the attackers and the network. We consider two cases: a static case where the attackers' node capture rates are time-invariant and the network's clone detection/revocation rate is a linear function of the state, and a dynamic case where the rates are general functions of time. We characterize Nash equilibrium solutions for both cases and derive equilibrium strategies for the players. In the static case, we study both the single-attacker and the multi-attacker games within an optimization framework, provide conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria and characterize them in closed forms. In the dynamic case, we study the underlying multi-person differential game under an open-loop information structure and provide a set of conditions to characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium. We show the equivalence of the Nash equilibrium for the multi-person game to the saddle-point equilibrium between the network and the attackers as a team. We illustrate our results with numerical examples.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Pages3404-3411
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012 - Maui, HI, United States
Duration: Dec 10 2012Dec 13 2012

Other

Other51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012
CountryUnited States
CityMaui, HI
Period12/10/1212/13/12

Fingerprint

Cloning
Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks
Attack
Game
Nash Equilibrium
Vertex of a graph
Sensor nodes
Person
Revocation
Information Structure
Equilibrium Solution
Differential Games
Saddlepoint
Clone
Linear Function
Closed-form
Equivalence
Numerical Examples
Sensor

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Zhu, Q., Bushnell, L., & Basar, T. (2012). Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (pp. 3404-3411). [6426481] https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2012.6426481

Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks. / Zhu, Quanyan; Bushnell, Linda; Basar, Tamer.

Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2012. p. 3404-3411 6426481.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhu, Q, Bushnell, L & Basar, T 2012, Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks. in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control., 6426481, pp. 3404-3411, 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012, Maui, HI, United States, 12/10/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2012.6426481
Zhu Q, Bushnell L, Basar T. Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2012. p. 3404-3411. 6426481 https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2012.6426481
Zhu, Quanyan ; Bushnell, Linda ; Basar, Tamer. / Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2012. pp. 3404-3411
@inproceedings{d5b0e04ad72a4d0fb022e928c30c0cf9,
title = "Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks",
abstract = "Wireless sensor networks are subject to attacks such as node capture and cloning, where an attacker physically captures sensor nodes, replicates the nodes, which are deployed into the network, and proceeds to take over the network. In this paper, we develop models for such an attack when there are multiple attackers in a network, and formulate multi-player games to model the noncooperative strategic behavior between the attackers and the network. We consider two cases: a static case where the attackers' node capture rates are time-invariant and the network's clone detection/revocation rate is a linear function of the state, and a dynamic case where the rates are general functions of time. We characterize Nash equilibrium solutions for both cases and derive equilibrium strategies for the players. In the static case, we study both the single-attacker and the multi-attacker games within an optimization framework, provide conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria and characterize them in closed forms. In the dynamic case, we study the underlying multi-person differential game under an open-loop information structure and provide a set of conditions to characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium. We show the equivalence of the Nash equilibrium for the multi-person game to the saddle-point equilibrium between the network and the attackers as a team. We illustrate our results with numerical examples.",
author = "Quanyan Zhu and Linda Bushnell and Tamer Basar",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1109/CDC.2012.6426481",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "3404--3411",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Game-theoretic analysis of node capture and cloning attack with multiple attackers in wireless sensor networks

AU - Zhu, Quanyan

AU - Bushnell, Linda

AU - Basar, Tamer

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Wireless sensor networks are subject to attacks such as node capture and cloning, where an attacker physically captures sensor nodes, replicates the nodes, which are deployed into the network, and proceeds to take over the network. In this paper, we develop models for such an attack when there are multiple attackers in a network, and formulate multi-player games to model the noncooperative strategic behavior between the attackers and the network. We consider two cases: a static case where the attackers' node capture rates are time-invariant and the network's clone detection/revocation rate is a linear function of the state, and a dynamic case where the rates are general functions of time. We characterize Nash equilibrium solutions for both cases and derive equilibrium strategies for the players. In the static case, we study both the single-attacker and the multi-attacker games within an optimization framework, provide conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria and characterize them in closed forms. In the dynamic case, we study the underlying multi-person differential game under an open-loop information structure and provide a set of conditions to characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium. We show the equivalence of the Nash equilibrium for the multi-person game to the saddle-point equilibrium between the network and the attackers as a team. We illustrate our results with numerical examples.

AB - Wireless sensor networks are subject to attacks such as node capture and cloning, where an attacker physically captures sensor nodes, replicates the nodes, which are deployed into the network, and proceeds to take over the network. In this paper, we develop models for such an attack when there are multiple attackers in a network, and formulate multi-player games to model the noncooperative strategic behavior between the attackers and the network. We consider two cases: a static case where the attackers' node capture rates are time-invariant and the network's clone detection/revocation rate is a linear function of the state, and a dynamic case where the rates are general functions of time. We characterize Nash equilibrium solutions for both cases and derive equilibrium strategies for the players. In the static case, we study both the single-attacker and the multi-attacker games within an optimization framework, provide conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria and characterize them in closed forms. In the dynamic case, we study the underlying multi-person differential game under an open-loop information structure and provide a set of conditions to characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium. We show the equivalence of the Nash equilibrium for the multi-person game to the saddle-point equilibrium between the network and the attackers as a team. We illustrate our results with numerical examples.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84874245895&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84874245895&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2012.6426481

DO - 10.1109/CDC.2012.6426481

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 3404

EP - 3411

BT - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

ER -