Further attacks on Yeung-Mintzer fragile watermarking scheme

Jiri Fridrich, Miroslav Goljan, Nasir Memon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we describe new and improved attacks on the authentication scheme previously proposed by Yeung and Mintzer. Previous attacks assumed that the binary watermark logo inserted in an image for the purposes of authentication was known. Here we remove that assumption and show how the scheme is still vulnerable, even if the binary logo is not known but the attacker has access to multiple images that have been watermarked with the same secret key and contain the same (but unknown) logo. We present two attacks. The first attack infers the secret watermark insertion function and the binary logo, given multiple images authenticated with the same key and containing the same logo. We show that a very good approximation to the logo and watermark insertion function can be constructed using as few as two images. With color images, one needs many more images, nevertheless the attack is still feasible. The second attack we present, which we call the `collage-attack' is a variation of the Holliman-Memon counterfeiting attack. The proposed variation does not require knowledge of the watermark logo and produces counterfeits of superior quality by means of a suitable dithering process that we develop.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering
PublisherSPIE
Pages428-437
Number of pages10
Volume3971
StatePublished - 2000
EventSecurity and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents II - San Jose, CA, USA
Duration: Jan 24 2000Jan 26 2000

Other

OtherSecurity and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents II
CitySan Jose, CA, USA
Period1/24/001/26/00

Fingerprint

Watermarking
Authentication
attack
Color
insertion
color
approximation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Condensed Matter Physics

Cite this

Fridrich, J., Goljan, M., & Memon, N. (2000). Further attacks on Yeung-Mintzer fragile watermarking scheme. In Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering (Vol. 3971, pp. 428-437). SPIE.

Further attacks on Yeung-Mintzer fragile watermarking scheme. / Fridrich, Jiri; Goljan, Miroslav; Memon, Nasir.

Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering. Vol. 3971 SPIE, 2000. p. 428-437.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Fridrich, J, Goljan, M & Memon, N 2000, Further attacks on Yeung-Mintzer fragile watermarking scheme. in Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering. vol. 3971, SPIE, pp. 428-437, Security and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents II, San Jose, CA, USA, 1/24/00.
Fridrich J, Goljan M, Memon N. Further attacks on Yeung-Mintzer fragile watermarking scheme. In Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering. Vol. 3971. SPIE. 2000. p. 428-437
Fridrich, Jiri ; Goljan, Miroslav ; Memon, Nasir. / Further attacks on Yeung-Mintzer fragile watermarking scheme. Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering. Vol. 3971 SPIE, 2000. pp. 428-437
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