From mean field interaction to evolutionary game dynamics

Tembine Hamidou, Jean Yves Le Boudec, Rachid ElAouzi, Eitan Altaian

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider evolving games with finite number of players, in which each player interacts with other randomly selected players. The types and actions of each player in an interaction together determine the instantaneous payoff for all involved players. They also determine the rate of transition between type-actions. We provide a rigorous derivation of the asymptotic behavior of this system as the size of the population grows. We show that the large population asymptotic of the microscopic model is equivalent to a macroscopic evolutionary game in which a local interaction is described by a single player against an evolving population profile. We derive various classes of evolutionary game dynamics. We apply these results to spatial random access games in wireless networks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationFinal Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
Event2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: Jun 23 2009Jun 27 2009

Other

Other2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009
CountryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period6/23/096/27/09

Fingerprint

Wireless networks

Keywords

  • Evolutionary game dynamics
  • Micro to macro

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

Hamidou, T., Le Boudec, J. Y., ElAouzi, R., & Altaian, E. (2009). From mean field interaction to evolutionary game dynamics. In Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009 [5291592] https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.WIOPT2009.6282

From mean field interaction to evolutionary game dynamics. / Hamidou, Tembine; Le Boudec, Jean Yves; ElAouzi, Rachid; Altaian, Eitan.

Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009. 2009. 5291592.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hamidou, T, Le Boudec, JY, ElAouzi, R & Altaian, E 2009, From mean field interaction to evolutionary game dynamics. in Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009., 5291592, 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009, Seoul, Korea, Republic of, 6/23/09. https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.WIOPT2009.6282
Hamidou T, Le Boudec JY, ElAouzi R, Altaian E. From mean field interaction to evolutionary game dynamics. In Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009. 2009. 5291592 https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.WIOPT2009.6282
Hamidou, Tembine ; Le Boudec, Jean Yves ; ElAouzi, Rachid ; Altaian, Eitan. / From mean field interaction to evolutionary game dynamics. Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009. 2009.
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