Free to trade

Democracies, Autocracies, and International trade

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, Bryan Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Relatively little research has focused on whether countries' political institutions affect their international trade relations. We address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy. In a formal model of commercial policy, we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country-pairs (composed of an autocracy and a democracy). We test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990. The results of this analysis accord with our argument: Democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)305-321
    Number of pages17
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume94
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - Jun 2000

    Fingerprint

    trade relation
    world trade
    regime
    democracy
    trade barrier
    ratification
    dictatorship
    trade policy
    political institution
    responsibility

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. (2000). Free to trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International trade. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 305-321.

    Free to trade : Democracies, Autocracies, and International trade. / Mansfield, Edward D.; Milner, Helen V.; Rosendorff, Bryan.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, 06.2000, p. 305-321.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Mansfield, ED, Milner, HV & Rosendorff, B 2000, 'Free to trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International trade', American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 305-321.
    Mansfield ED, Milner HV, Rosendorff B. Free to trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International trade. American Political Science Review. 2000 Jun;94(2):305-321.
    Mansfield, Edward D. ; Milner, Helen V. ; Rosendorff, Bryan. / Free to trade : Democracies, Autocracies, and International trade. In: American Political Science Review. 2000 ; Vol. 94, No. 2. pp. 305-321.
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