Financial contagion

Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. Because liquidity preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions, banks hold interregional claims on other banks to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, the first-best allocation of risk sharing can be achieved. However, this arrangement is financially fragile. A small liquidity preference shock in one region can spread by contagion throughout the economy. The possibility of contagion depends strongly on the completeness of the structure of interregional claims. Complete claims structures are shown to be more robust than incomplete structures.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1-33
    Number of pages33
    JournalJournal of Political Economy
    Volume108
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2000

    Fingerprint

    Financial contagion
    Liquidity preference
    Contagion
    Completeness
    Aggregate uncertainty
    Insurance
    Risk sharing

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Financial contagion. / Allen, Franklin; Gale, Douglas.

    In: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2000, p. 1-33.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Allen, F & Gale, D 2000, 'Financial contagion', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108, no. 1, pp. 1-33. https://doi.org/10.1086/262109
    Allen, Franklin ; Gale, Douglas. / Financial contagion. In: Journal of Political Economy. 2000 ; Vol. 108, No. 1. pp. 1-33.
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