Exit Strategy

Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress

Michael E. Shepherd, Hye Young You

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Although the majority of research on revolving-door lobbyists centers on the influence they exercise during their postgovernment careers, relatively little attention is given to whether future career concerns affect the behaviors of revolving-door lobbyists while they still work in government. We argue that the revolving-door incentivizes congressional staffers to showcase their legislative skills to the lobbying market in ways that affect policymaking in Congress. Using comprehensive data on congressional staffers, we find that employing staffers who later become lobbyists is associated with higher legislative productivity for members of Congress, especially in staffers' final terms in Congress. It also is associated with increases in a member's bill sponsorship in the areas of health and commerce, the topics most frequently addressed by clients in the lobbying industry, as well as granting more access to lobbying firms. These results provide the systematic empirical evidence of pre-exit effects of the revolving-door among congressional staff.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

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    career
    sponsorship
    commerce
    bill
    productivity
    staff
    firm
    industry
    market
    health
    evidence

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Exit Strategy : Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress. / Shepherd, Michael E.; You, Hye Young.

    In: American Political Science Review, 01.01.2019.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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