Ex post lobbying

Hye Young You

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    Nearly half of all lobbying activity targeting specific bills between 1998 and 2012 happened after the Congress passed legislation, yet existing theories of lobbying generally fail to account for lobbying that occurs after a bill is passed. I argue that ex post lobbying aims to influence the distribution of particularistic benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making processes. I develop a model that describes lobbying as a collective action problem among interest groups, who must trade off between spending money to lobby for a bill's passage and spending money to lobby over the details of its implementation. The implications of the model suggest that bills with high proportions of particularistic provisions draw more ex post lobbying and that trade associations and larger firms bear a disproportionately large share of the ex ante lobbying burden. Empirical analysis of lobbying reports is consistent with these predictions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1162-1176
    Number of pages15
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume79
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2017

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    bill
    lobby
    money
    legislation
    trade association
    collective behavior
    interest group
    firm

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Ex post lobbying. / You, Hye Young.

    In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 79, No. 4, 01.10.2017, p. 1162-1176.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    You, HY 2017, 'Ex post lobbying', Journal of Politics, vol. 79, no. 4, pp. 1162-1176. https://doi.org/10.1086/692473
    You, Hye Young. / Ex post lobbying. In: Journal of Politics. 2017 ; Vol. 79, No. 4. pp. 1162-1176.
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