Evolutionary games for multiple access control

Quanyan Zhu, Tembine Hamidou, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access control game with continuous-variable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics, such as Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics, Smith dynamics, and replicator dynamics. In addition, we examine correlated equilibrium for the single-receiver model. Correlated strategies are based on signaling structures before making decisions on rates. We then focus on evolutionary games for hybrid additive white Gaussian noise multiple-access channel with multiple users and multiple receivers, where each user chooses a rate and splits it over the receivers. Users have coupled constraints determined by the capacity regions. Building upon the static game, we formulate a system of hybrid evolutionary game dynamics using G-function dynamics and Smith dynamics on rate control and channel selection, respectively. We show that the evolving game has an equilibrium and illustrate these dynamics with numerical examples.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
PublisherBirkhauser
Pages39-71
Number of pages33
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

Publication series

NameAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
Volume12
ISSN (Print)2474-0179
ISSN (Electronic)2474-0187

Fingerprint

Evolutionary Game
Multiple Access
Access Control
Access control
Game
Price of Anarchy
Receiver
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Replicator Dynamics
Multiple Access Channel
Rate Control
Equilibrium Solution
Continuous Variables
G-function
Gaussian White Noise
Coalitions
Evolutionary game
Long-run
Deviation
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Keywords

  • Access control
  • Capacity region
  • Evolutionary game dynamics
  • G-functions
  • Game theory
  • Hybriddynamics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Zhu, Q., Hamidou, T., & Başar, T. (2013). Evolutionary games for multiple access control. In Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (pp. 39-71). (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games; Vol. 12). Birkhauser. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8355-9_3

Evolutionary games for multiple access control. / Zhu, Quanyan; Hamidou, Tembine; Başar, Tamer.

Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Birkhauser, 2013. p. 39-71 (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games; Vol. 12).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Zhu, Q, Hamidou, T & Başar, T 2013, Evolutionary games for multiple access control. in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol. 12, Birkhauser, pp. 39-71. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8355-9_3
Zhu Q, Hamidou T, Başar T. Evolutionary games for multiple access control. In Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Birkhauser. 2013. p. 39-71. (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8355-9_3
Zhu, Quanyan ; Hamidou, Tembine ; Başar, Tamer. / Evolutionary games for multiple access control. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Birkhauser, 2013. pp. 39-71 (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games).
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