Evolutionary games and population dynamics

Maintenance of cooperation in public goods games

Christoph Hauert, Miranda Holmes-Cerfon, Michael Doebeli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by classical models for cooperation in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Traditional approaches to studying the problem of cooperation assume constant population sizes and thus neglect the ecology of the interacting individuals. Here, we incorporate ecological dynamics into evolutionary games and reveal a new mechanism for maintaining cooperation. In public goods games, cooperation can gain a foothold if the population density depends on the average population payoff. Decreasing population densities, due to defection leading to small payoffs, results in smaller interaction group sizes in which cooperation can be favoured. This feedback between ecological dynamics and game dynamics can generate stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in public goods games. However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2565-2570
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society
Volume273
Issue number1600
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 7 2006

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Population dynamics
Population Dynamics
Population Density
population dynamics
Maintenance
population density
prisoner dilemma
Game Theory
Population
game theory
Game theory
Ecology
group size
cooperatives
Cooperative Behavior
population size
extinction
cooperative behavior
evolutionary theory
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Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Evolutionary game theory
  • Population dynamics
  • Prisoner's Dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Evolutionary games and population dynamics : Maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. / Hauert, Christoph; Holmes-Cerfon, Miranda; Doebeli, Michael.

In: Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society, Vol. 273, No. 1600, 07.10.2006, p. 2565-2570.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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