Evolutionary coalitional games for random access control

Xin Luo, Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    In this paper we consider a random access system where each user can be in two modes of operation, has a packet or not and the set of users which have a packet is available to a shared medium. We propose an evolving coalitional game theory to analyze the system outcomes. Unlike classical coalitional approaches that assume that coalitional structures are fixed and formed with cost-free, we explain how coalitions can be formed in a fully distributed manner using evolutionary dynamics and coalitional combined fully distributed payoff and strategy (CODIPAS) learning. We introduce the concept of evolutionarily stable coalitional structure (ESCS), which is, when it is formed it is resilient by small perturbation of strategies. We show that (i) the formation and the stability of coalitions depend mainly on the cost of making a coalition compared to the benefit of cooperation, (ii) the grand coalition can be unstable and a localized coalitional structure is formed as an evolutionarily stable coalitional structure. When the core is empty, the coalitional CODIPAS scheme selects one of the stable sets. Finally, we discuss the convergence and complexity of the proposed coalitional CODIPAS learning in access control with different users' activities.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013
    Pages535-539
    Number of pages5
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Sep 2 2013
    Event32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013 - Turin, Italy
    Duration: Apr 14 2013Apr 19 2013

    Other

    Other32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013
    CountryItaly
    CityTurin
    Period4/14/134/19/13

    Fingerprint

    Access control
    Game theory
    Costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Science(all)
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    Cite this

    Luo, X., & Hamidou, T. (2013). Evolutionary coalitional games for random access control. In 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013 (pp. 535-539). [6566830] https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566830

    Evolutionary coalitional games for random access control. / Luo, Xin; Hamidou, Tembine.

    2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013. 2013. p. 535-539 6566830.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Luo, X & Hamidou, T 2013, Evolutionary coalitional games for random access control. in 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013., 6566830, pp. 535-539, 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013, Turin, Italy, 4/14/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566830
    Luo X, Hamidou T. Evolutionary coalitional games for random access control. In 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013. 2013. p. 535-539. 6566830 https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566830
    Luo, Xin ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Evolutionary coalitional games for random access control. 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013. 2013. pp. 535-539
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