Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games

Levent Koçkesen, Ahmet Ok, Rajiv Sethi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with interdependent preferences (who care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) earn strictly higher material payoffs than do the material payoff maximizers. Implications of this finding for the theory of preference evolution are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)303-310
    Number of pages8
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume31
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 2000

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    Interdependent preferences
    Aggregative games
    Evolution of preferences
    Economics
    Interdependence
    Objective function

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games. / Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Ahmet; Sethi, Rajiv.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 31, No. 2, 05.2000, p. 303-310.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Koçkesen, Levent ; Ok, Ahmet ; Sethi, Rajiv. / Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2000 ; Vol. 31, No. 2. pp. 303-310.
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