Abstract
We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 25-35 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | European Journal of Political Economy |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1 2010 |
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Keywords
- Cooperation
- Experiment
- Intergroup competition
- Public goods
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
Everyone is a winner : Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition. / Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean Robert.
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 1, 01.03.2010, p. 25-35.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Everyone is a winner
T2 - Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition
AU - Reuben, Ernesto
AU - Tyran, Jean Robert
PY - 2010/3/1
Y1 - 2010/3/1
N2 - We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.
AB - We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Experiment
KW - Intergroup competition
KW - Public goods
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=72149095721&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=72149095721&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.10.002
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.10.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:72149095721
VL - 26
SP - 25
EP - 35
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0176-2680
IS - 1
ER -