Everyone is a winner: Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition

Ernesto Reuben, Jean Robert Tyran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)25-35
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2010

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Group
incentive
Incentives
Intergroup
performance
Disadvantage
Negative externalities
Group performance

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Experiment
  • Intergroup competition
  • Public goods

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Everyone is a winner : Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition. / Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean Robert.

In: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 1, 01.03.2010, p. 25-35.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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