EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION

THERE IS NO MEDIAN CONVERGENCE.

Steven Brams, Samuel Merrill

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Final-offer arbitration is modeled as a two-person, zero-sum game of imperfect information, in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator's fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs. Necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived, and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)927-941
    Number of pages15
    JournalManagement Science
    Volume29
    Issue number8
    StatePublished - Aug 1983

    Fingerprint

    Probability distributions
    Median
    Imperfect information
    Mixed strategy
    Pure strategies
    Probability distribution
    Zero-sum game
    Bid
    Final-offer arbitration

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Management of Technology and Innovation
    • Strategy and Management
    • Management Science and Operations Research

    Cite this

    EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION : THERE IS NO MEDIAN CONVERGENCE. / Brams, Steven; Merrill, Samuel.

    In: Management Science, Vol. 29, No. 8, 08.1983, p. 927-941.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Brams, Steven ; Merrill, Samuel. / EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION : THERE IS NO MEDIAN CONVERGENCE. In: Management Science. 1983 ; Vol. 29, No. 8. pp. 927-941.
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