Equilibrium binding agreements

Debraj Ray, Rajiv Vohra

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A solution concept and its applications are discussed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)30-78
    Number of pages49
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume73
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 1997

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    Economics
    Solution concepts
    Coalition structure
    Characteristic function

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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    Equilibrium binding agreements. / Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 73, No. 1, 03.1997, p. 30-78.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Ray, Debraj ; Vohra, Rajiv. / Equilibrium binding agreements. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1997 ; Vol. 73, No. 1. pp. 30-78.
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