Enough! electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions

Joshua Tucker

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In countries where citizens have strong grievances against the regime, attempts to address diese grievances in the course of daily life are likely to entail high costs coupled with very low chances of success in any meaningful sense; consequently, most citizens will choose not to challenge the regime, thus reflecting the now well-known collective action problem. When a regime commits electoral fraud, however, an individual's calculus regarding whether to participate in a protest against the regime can be changed significantly. This argument yields important implications for how we interpret the wave of "colored revolutions" that swept through Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the first half of this decade. Applying the collective action framework to the colored revolutions also yields a parsimonious contribution to the political science literature on social protest: electoral fraud can be a remarkably useful tool for solving the collective action problems faced by citizens in countries where governments are not, to use Barry Weingast's language, appropriately restrained by the populace. While modest, such an observation actually can speak to a wide-ranging number of questions in the literature, including why people choose to protest when they do, how protests atone place and time can affect the likelihood for future protests, and new aspects of the relationship between elections and protest.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)535-551
    Number of pages17
    JournalPerspectives on Politics
    Volume5
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Sep 2007

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    fraud
    collective behavior
    protest
    regime
    citizen
    Kyrgyzstan
    Serbia
    Ukraine
    political science
    election
    costs
    language

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Enough! electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. / Tucker, Joshua.

    In: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 09.2007, p. 535-551.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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