Endogenous lobbying

Leonardo Felli, Antonio Merlo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In this article, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)180-215
    Number of pages36
    JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
    Volume4
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 2006

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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