Endogenous election timing in majoritarian parliamentary systems

Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)85-107
    Number of pages23
    JournalEconomics and Politics
    Volume8
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - 1996

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    election
    business cycle
    asymmetry
    faith
    Elections
    incentive
    opposition
    Government
    ability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Geography, Planning and Development

    Cite this

    Endogenous election timing in majoritarian parliamentary systems. / Smith, Alastair.

    In: Economics and Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1996, p. 85-107.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Smith, Alastair. / Endogenous election timing in majoritarian parliamentary systems. In: Economics and Politics. 1996 ; Vol. 8, No. 2. pp. 85-107.
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