End-to-end DWDM optical link power-control via a Stackelberg revenue-maximizing model

Quanyan Zhu, Lacra Pavel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper deals with a Stackelberg formulation for the power control problem in optical networks. The new model adds an extra dimension to the recent OSNR game model and gives flexibility in optimizing the network performance (e.g. OSNR) and regulate the network conditions (e.g. power capacity). We 'engineer' the Stackelberg player to be a revenue-maximizing agent who designs pricing policies with complete information of the followers to optimize his own profit. We investigate both the unconstrained Stackelberg model and the one subject to capacity constraints, and characterize their solutions analytically. Finally, we use geometric programming and coordinate descent method to design a distributed and iterative algorithm that is suited to the Stackelberg model implementation in optical networks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)505-520
Number of pages16
JournalInternational Journal of Network Management
Volume18
Issue number6 SPEC. ISS.
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2008

Fingerprint

Dense wavelength division multiplexing
Optical links
Power control
Fiber optic networks
Network performance
Profitability
Engineers
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

End-to-end DWDM optical link power-control via a Stackelberg revenue-maximizing model. / Zhu, Quanyan; Pavel, Lacra.

In: International Journal of Network Management, Vol. 18, No. 6 SPEC. ISS., 11.2008, p. 505-520.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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