Election timing in majoritarian parliaments

Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    I propose and test an informational theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate estimates of future outcomes than citizens. The prospect of declining future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, I test hypotheses relating the timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who call elections early, relative to expectations, experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)397-418
    Number of pages22
    JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
    Volume33
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2003

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    parliament
    election
    leader
    performance
    confidence
    citizen
    lack
    economics
    experience

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Election timing in majoritarian parliaments. / Smith, Alastair.

    In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, 07.2003, p. 397-418.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Smith, Alastair. / Election timing in majoritarian parliaments. In: British Journal of Political Science. 2003 ; Vol. 33, No. 3. pp. 397-418.
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