Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilkiliç, Hervé Moulin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers.Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)535-562
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume148
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2013

Fingerprint

Suppliers
Egalitarianism
Pareto optimal allocations
Equal treatment
Resources
Pareto optimality
Rationing
Strategy-proofness
Egalitarian solution
Workload
Connectivity
Single-peaked preferences

Keywords

  • Bipartite graph
  • Egalitarianism
  • Lorenz dominance
  • Single-peaked preferences
  • Strategyproofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. / Bochet, Olivier; Ilkiliç, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 148, No. 2, 01.03.2013, p. 535-562.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bochet, Olivier ; Ilkiliç, Rahmi ; Moulin, Hervé. / Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2013 ; Vol. 148, No. 2. pp. 535-562.
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