Efficient public-key cryptography in the presence of key leakage

Yevgeniy Dodis, Kristiyan Haralambiev, Adriana López-Alt, Daniel Wichs

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We study the design of cryptographic primitives resistant to a large class of side-channel attacks, called "memory attacks", where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of such information is bounded by some parameter ℓ. Although the study of such primitives was initiated only recently by Akavia et al. [2], subsequent work already produced many such "leakage-resilient" primitives [48,4,42], including signature, encryption, identification (ID) and authenticated key agreement (AKA) schemes. Unfortunately, every existing scheme, - for any of the four fundamental primitives above, - fails to satisfy at least one of the following desirable properties: - Efficiency. While the construction may be generic, it should have some efficient instantiations, based on standard cryptographic assumptions, and without relying on random oracles. - Strong Security. The construction should satisfy the strongest possible definition of security (even in the presence of leakage). For example, encryption schemes should be secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA), while signatures should be existentially unforgeable. - Leakage Flexibility. It should be possible to set the scheme parameters so that the leakage bound ℓ can come arbitrarily close to the secret-key size. In this work we design the first signature, encryption, ID and AKA schemes which overcome these limitations, and satisfy all the properties above. Moreover, all our constructions are generic, in several cases elegantly simplifying and generalizing the prior constructions (which did not have any efficient instantiations). We also introduce several tools of independent interest, such as the abstraction (and constructions) of true-simulation extractable NIZK arguments, and a new deniable DH-based AKA protocol based on any CCA-secure encryption.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology, ASIACRYPT 2010 - 16th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings
Pages613-631
Number of pages19
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2010
Event16th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2010 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: Dec 5 2010Dec 9 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6477 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other16th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2010
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period12/5/1012/9/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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  • Cite this

    Dodis, Y., Haralambiev, K., López-Alt, A., & Wichs, D. (2010). Efficient public-key cryptography in the presence of key leakage. In Advances in Cryptology, ASIACRYPT 2010 - 16th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings (pp. 613-631). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 6477 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17373-8_35