Dynamic routing games

An evolutionary game theoretic approach

Tembine Hamidou, Amar Prakash Azad

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    We consider a dynamic routing problem where the objective of each user is to obtain flow policy that minimizes its long term cost. The framework differs from other related works which consider collection of static one shot games with dynamic cost function. Instead, we motivate our problem from the two basic facts: i) the path cost may not be exactly known in advance in dynamic environment unlike static; ii) long term solution is important aspect to evaluate rather than obtaining one slot solution. Moreover, this constraint inhibits to apply traditional game theoretic approach to obtain equilibria, rather we discuss that it is not required to obtain equilibria at every slot to "cover" the dynamic environment. In this work we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach, we intend to learn the optimal strategy exploiting the past experiences (information) instead of cost function. Further, we characterize the dynamic equilibria of the long-term game using evolutionary variational inequalities. The dynamic equilibria so obtained, optimizes the long term cost, however it need not to be an equilibrium for intermediate epochs (games). As a byproduct, this reduces drastically the computation complexity. Under strictly monotone cost function, we prove that the dynamic equilibria are also dynamic evolutionarily stable strategies.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
    Pages4516-4521
    Number of pages6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2011
    Event2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 - Orlando, FL, United States
    Duration: Dec 12 2011Dec 15 2011

    Other

    Other2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
    CountryUnited States
    CityOrlando, FL
    Period12/12/1112/15/11

    Fingerprint

    Dynamic Routing
    Evolutionary Game
    Game
    Cost Function
    Cost functions
    Dynamic Environment
    Costs
    Term
    Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
    Monotone Function
    Routing Problem
    Dynamic Problem
    Optimal Strategy
    Variational Inequalities
    Strictly
    Optimise
    Cover
    Byproducts
    Minimise
    Path

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Control and Systems Engineering
    • Modeling and Simulation
    • Control and Optimization

    Cite this

    Hamidou, T., & Azad, A. P. (2011). Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 (pp. 4516-4521). [6161167] https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6161167

    Dynamic routing games : An evolutionary game theoretic approach. / Hamidou, Tembine; Azad, Amar Prakash.

    2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011. 2011. p. 4516-4521 6161167.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Hamidou, T & Azad, AP 2011, Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach. in 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011., 6161167, pp. 4516-4521, 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011, Orlando, FL, United States, 12/12/11. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6161167
    Hamidou T, Azad AP. Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011. 2011. p. 4516-4521. 6161167 https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6161167
    Hamidou, Tembine ; Azad, Amar Prakash. / Dynamic routing games : An evolutionary game theoretic approach. 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011. 2011. pp. 4516-4521
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