Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach

Tembine Hamidou, Amar Prakash Azad

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider a dynamic routing problem where the objective of each user is to obtain flow policy that minimizes its long term cost. The framework differs from other related works which consider collection of static one shot games with dynamic cost function. Instead, we motivate our problem from the two basic facts: i) the path cost may not be exactly known in advance in dynamic environment unlike static; ii) long term solution is important aspect to evaluate rather than obtaining one slot solution. Moreover, this constraint inhibits to apply traditional game theoretic approach to obtain equilibria, rather we discuss that it is not required to obtain equilibria at every slot to "cover" the dynamic environment. In this work we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach, we intend to learn the optimal strategy exploiting the past experiences (information) instead of cost function. Further, we characterize the dynamic equilibria of the long-term game using evolutionary variational inequalities. The dynamic equilibria so obtained, optimizes the long term cost, however it need not to be an equilibrium for intermediate epochs (games). As a byproduct, this reduces drastically the computation complexity. Under strictly monotone cost function, we prove that the dynamic equilibria are also dynamic evolutionarily stable strategies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
Pages4516-4521
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011
Event2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 - Orlando, FL, United States
Duration: Dec 12 2011Dec 15 2011

Other

Other2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
CountryUnited States
CityOrlando, FL
Period12/12/1112/15/11

Fingerprint

Dynamic Routing
Evolutionary Game
Game
Cost Function
Cost functions
Dynamic Environment
Costs
Term
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Monotone Function
Routing Problem
Dynamic Problem
Optimal Strategy
Variational Inequalities
Strictly
Optimise
Cover
Byproducts
Minimise
Path

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Hamidou, T., & Azad, A. P. (2011). Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 (pp. 4516-4521). [6161167] https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6161167

Dynamic routing games : An evolutionary game theoretic approach. / Hamidou, Tembine; Azad, Amar Prakash.

2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011. 2011. p. 4516-4521 6161167.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hamidou, T & Azad, AP 2011, Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach. in 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011., 6161167, pp. 4516-4521, 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011, Orlando, FL, United States, 12/12/11. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6161167
Hamidou T, Azad AP. Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011. 2011. p. 4516-4521. 6161167 https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6161167
Hamidou, Tembine ; Azad, Amar Prakash. / Dynamic routing games : An evolutionary game theoretic approach. 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011. 2011. pp. 4516-4521
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