Dynamic bargaining solutions for opportunistic spectrum access

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper studies dynamic bargaining solutions for opportunistic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks. We compare the bargaining solutions with global optimum and non-cooperative solution in a strategic setting. We examine the cost of bargaining and the benefit of bargaining in the stochastic bargaining opportunistic access game in which each user has its own state those transitions are described as Markov decision processes with local resource states. The states and actions of the users which sense the same channel determine the instantaneous payoffs. They also determine the transition probabilities to move to the next states. We characterize the dynamic bargaining outcomes in short term and in long-term.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2009 2nd IFIP Wireless Days, WD 2009
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
Event2009 2nd IFIP Wireless Days, WD 2009 - Paris, France
Duration: Dec 15 2009Dec 17 2009

Other

Other2009 2nd IFIP Wireless Days, WD 2009
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period12/15/0912/17/09

Fingerprint

Cognitive radio
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Dynamic bargaining solutions for opportunistic spectrum access. / Hamidou, Tembine.

2009 2nd IFIP Wireless Days, WD 2009. 2009. 5449674.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hamidou, T 2009, Dynamic bargaining solutions for opportunistic spectrum access. in 2009 2nd IFIP Wireless Days, WD 2009., 5449674, 2009 2nd IFIP Wireless Days, WD 2009, Paris, France, 12/15/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/WD.2009.5449674
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