Double deception

Two against one in three-person games

Steven Brams, Frank C. Zagare

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This article examines deception possibilities for two players in simple three-person voting games. An example of one game vulnerable to (tacit) deception by two players is given and its implications discussed. The most unexpected findings of this study is that in those games vulnerable to deception by two players, the optimal strategy of one of them is always to announce his (true) preference order. Moreover, since the player whose optimal announcement is his true one is unable to induce a better outcome for himself by misrepresenting his preference, while his partner can, this player will find that possessing a monopoly of information will not give him any special advantage. In fact, this analysis demonstrates that he may have incentives to share his information selectively with one or another of his opponents should he alone possess complete information at the outset.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)81-90
    Number of pages10
    JournalTheory and Decision: An International Journal for Multidisciplinary Advances in Decision Science
    Volume13
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1981

    Fingerprint

    Deception
    human being
    Politics
    monopoly
    voting
    Motivation
    incentive
    Person
    Players

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Decision Sciences(all)
    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
    • Applied Psychology
    • Developmental and Educational Psychology
    • Social Sciences(all)

    Cite this

    Double deception : Two against one in three-person games. / Brams, Steven; Zagare, Frank C.

    In: Theory and Decision: An International Journal for Multidisciplinary Advances in Decision Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1981, p. 81-90.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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