Domestic Opposition and Foreign War

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, David Lalman

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Domestic opposition to violent, escalatory national policies during international crises has long been considered an important factor influencing the foreign policy behavior of nations. Yet the explicit theoretical linkages between domestic opposition and crisis choices have not been investigated. To provide these linkages, we set out an extensive form game of sequential decisions leading to the various consequences of crises together with their attendant costs and benefits. Our findings indicate that an antagonist's beliefs about domestic opposition are not particularly effective levers to manipulate in crises when a peaceful resolution is the goal.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)747-765
    Number of pages19
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume84
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1990

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    Cite this

    Domestic Opposition and Foreign War. / Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Lalman, David.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, 1990, p. 747-765.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bueno De Mesquita, B & Lalman, D 1990, 'Domestic Opposition and Foreign War', American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 747-765. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962765
    Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ; Lalman, David. / Domestic Opposition and Foreign War. In: American Political Science Review. 1990 ; Vol. 84, No. 3. pp. 747-765.
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