Does Unbundling Policy Authority Improve Accountability?

Dimitri Landa, Patrick Le Bihan

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We develop a model to analyze the effects of complexity of policy areas on the desirability of bundling or unbundling policy-making authority. We find that bundling tends to increase political accountability when the complexities of bundled policy areas are sufficiently symmetric and decrease it when the complexities are sufficiently asymmetric. When bundling is beneficial, its advantage comes from the possibility of sustaining in equilibrium a mechanism that makes greater investment into policy in multiple issue areas a form of insurance purchase for the officeholder. The appeal of such insurance purchases and the edge they give to bundling persist in the presence of the possibility of policy capture by special interests, upending the conventional wisdom.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalJournal of Politics
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - Jul 1 2018

    Fingerprint

    policy area
    responsibility
    insurance
    purchase
    wisdom
    appeal

    Keywords

    • authority unbundling
    • multitask
    • policy capture
    • political accountability
    • task complexity

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Does Unbundling Policy Authority Improve Accountability? / Landa, Dimitri; Le Bihan, Patrick.

    In: Journal of Politics, 01.07.2018.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Landa, Dimitri ; Le Bihan, Patrick. / Does Unbundling Policy Authority Improve Accountability?. In: Journal of Politics. 2018.
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