Do people with specific skills want more social insurance? Not in the United States

Jeffrey Timmons, Jerry Nickelsburg

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Skill specificity is thought to increase preferences for social insurance (Iversen and Soskice, 2001, American Political Science Review 95,875), especially where employment protections are low, notably the United States (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012, Comparative Political Studies 45, 1624). The compensating differentials literature, by contrast, suggests that neither skill specificity, nor labor market protections affect preferences when wages adjust for differences in risks and investment costs. We examine these competing predictions using U.S. data on general and specific skills. Absolute and relative skill specificity have a robust positive correlation with income, but are negatively correlated with preferences for social protection. Our results strongly support the compensating differentials approach.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)457-482
    Number of pages26
    JournalEconomics and Politics
    Volume26
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

    Fingerprint

    Social insurance
    Specificity
    Compensating differentials
    Income
    Political Science
    Social protection
    Wages
    Employment protection
    Prediction
    Costs
    Labour market

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Do people with specific skills want more social insurance? Not in the United States. / Timmons, Jeffrey; Nickelsburg, Jerry.

    In: Economics and Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3, 01.01.2014, p. 457-482.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Timmons, Jeffrey ; Nickelsburg, Jerry. / Do people with specific skills want more social insurance? Not in the United States. In: Economics and Politics. 2014 ; Vol. 26, No. 3. pp. 457-482.
    @article{db7fa89109f44744b2817948f9e2c7e9,
    title = "Do people with specific skills want more social insurance? Not in the United States",
    abstract = "Skill specificity is thought to increase preferences for social insurance (Iversen and Soskice, 2001, American Political Science Review 95,875), especially where employment protections are low, notably the United States (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012, Comparative Political Studies 45, 1624). The compensating differentials literature, by contrast, suggests that neither skill specificity, nor labor market protections affect preferences when wages adjust for differences in risks and investment costs. We examine these competing predictions using U.S. data on general and specific skills. Absolute and relative skill specificity have a robust positive correlation with income, but are negatively correlated with preferences for social protection. Our results strongly support the compensating differentials approach.",
    author = "Jeffrey Timmons and Jerry Nickelsburg",
    year = "2014",
    month = "1",
    day = "1",
    doi = "10.1111/ecpo.12043",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "26",
    pages = "457--482",
    journal = "Economics and Politics",
    issn = "0954-1985",
    publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
    number = "3",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Do people with specific skills want more social insurance? Not in the United States

    AU - Timmons, Jeffrey

    AU - Nickelsburg, Jerry

    PY - 2014/1/1

    Y1 - 2014/1/1

    N2 - Skill specificity is thought to increase preferences for social insurance (Iversen and Soskice, 2001, American Political Science Review 95,875), especially where employment protections are low, notably the United States (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012, Comparative Political Studies 45, 1624). The compensating differentials literature, by contrast, suggests that neither skill specificity, nor labor market protections affect preferences when wages adjust for differences in risks and investment costs. We examine these competing predictions using U.S. data on general and specific skills. Absolute and relative skill specificity have a robust positive correlation with income, but are negatively correlated with preferences for social protection. Our results strongly support the compensating differentials approach.

    AB - Skill specificity is thought to increase preferences for social insurance (Iversen and Soskice, 2001, American Political Science Review 95,875), especially where employment protections are low, notably the United States (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012, Comparative Political Studies 45, 1624). The compensating differentials literature, by contrast, suggests that neither skill specificity, nor labor market protections affect preferences when wages adjust for differences in risks and investment costs. We examine these competing predictions using U.S. data on general and specific skills. Absolute and relative skill specificity have a robust positive correlation with income, but are negatively correlated with preferences for social protection. Our results strongly support the compensating differentials approach.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84908328417&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84908328417&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1111/ecpo.12043

    DO - 10.1111/ecpo.12043

    M3 - Article

    VL - 26

    SP - 457

    EP - 482

    JO - Economics and Politics

    JF - Economics and Politics

    SN - 0954-1985

    IS - 3

    ER -