Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, Dylan Minor, Dana Sisak

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)809-835
    Number of pages27
    JournalExperimental Economics
    Volume20
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2017

    Fingerprint

    Incentive pay
    Communication
    Organizational performance
    Social preferences
    Incentives
    Individual performance
    Group performance

    Keywords

    • Cooperation
    • Leadership
    • Relative performance
    • Social preferences

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

    Cite this

    Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay. / Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo; Minor, Dylan; Sisak, Dana.

    In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4, 01.12.2017, p. 809-835.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo ; Minor, Dylan ; Sisak, Dana. / Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay. In: Experimental Economics. 2017 ; Vol. 20, No. 4. pp. 809-835.
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