Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, Dylan Minor, Dana Sisak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)809-835
Number of pages27
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume20
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2017

Fingerprint

Incentive pay
Communication
Organizational performance
Social preferences
Incentives
Individual performance
Group performance

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Leadership
  • Relative performance
  • Social preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay. / Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo; Minor, Dylan; Sisak, Dana.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4, 01.12.2017, p. 809-835.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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