Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics

Muhammet Bas

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This article examines the relationship between regime type and decision makers' tendency to make suboptimal choices in international crises. To test hypotheses on the optimality of democratic foreign policy, the author uses a novel statistical measure of suboptimality in foreign policy behavior. This estimator builds on Signorino's statistical strategic models to allow for actor-level variation in deviations from optimal behavior in a strategic setting. An analysis of the international disputes from 1919 to 1999 shows that democratic leaders have a greater tendency to choose policies not optimal for their citizens than do nondemocratic leaders.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)799-824
    Number of pages26
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Volume56
    Issue number5
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 8 2012

    Fingerprint

    International Politics
    foreign policy
    regime
    leader
    decision maker
    citizen
    Foreign policy
    Inefficiency
    International politics
    Hypothesis test
    Deviation
    Optimality
    Estimator
    Decision maker
    Dispute

    Keywords

    • heteroskedasticity
    • interstate conflict
    • strategic models
    • suboptimal choices

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics. / Bas, Muhammet.

    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 5, 08.10.2012, p. 799-824.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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