Demand response management in the smart grid in a large population regime

Sabita Maharjan, Quanyan Zhu, Yan Zhang, Stein Gjessing, Tamer Başar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a hierarchical system model that captures the decision making processes involved in a network of multiple providers and a large number of consumers in the smart grid, incorporating multiple processes from power generation to market activities and to power consumption. We establish a Stackelberg game between providers and end users, where the providers behave as leaders maximizing their profit and end users act as the followers maximizing their individual welfare. We obtain closed-form expressions for the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game and prove that a unique equilibrium solution exists. In the large population regime, we show that a higher number of providers help to improve profits for the providers. This is inline with the goal of facilitating multiple distributed power generation units, one of the main design considerations in the smart grid. We further prove that there exist a unique number of providers that maximize their profits, and develop an iterative and distributed algorithm to obtain it. Finally, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the solutions and to corroborate the results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number7115166
Pages (from-to)189-199
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

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Profitability
Hierarchical systems
Distributed power generation
Parallel algorithms
Power generation
Electric power utilization
Decision making

Keywords

  • Consumer welfare
  • Demand response management (DRM)
  • Large population
  • Profit optimization
  • Stackelberg game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Demand response management in the smart grid in a large population regime. / Maharjan, Sabita; Zhu, Quanyan; Zhang, Yan; Gjessing, Stein; Başar, Tamer.

In: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Vol. 7, No. 1, 7115166, 01.01.2016, p. 189-199.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Maharjan, Sabita ; Zhu, Quanyan ; Zhang, Yan ; Gjessing, Stein ; Başar, Tamer. / Demand response management in the smart grid in a large population regime. In: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. 2016 ; Vol. 7, No. 1. pp. 189-199.
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