Deliberation as self-discovery and institutions for political speech

Catherine Hafer, Dimitri Landa

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We present a game-theoretic model of the social dynamics of belief change in which the (relevant) logically non-omniscient audience becomes convinced that the speakers' messages are 'true' because its own prior beliefs logically entail them, rather than as in cheap-talk models because the speaker is (endogenously) trustworthy. We characterize the equilibria of the game and consider how their aggregate informational properties change with the variation in the institutions determining the ability of the speakers to reach their audience. We find that for plausible restrictions on the distribution of arguments and on the corresponding policy preferences in society, the informationally optimal institutions are first-best implementable, inegalitarian with respect to the resource allocation across speakers, and assign priority to the (more) extreme argument- and policy-holders.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)329-360
    Number of pages32
    JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
    Volume19
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2007

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    political speech
    deliberation
    ability
    resources
    Society

    Keywords

    • Deliberation
    • Institutions
    • Non-Bayesian learning

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Deliberation as self-discovery and institutions for political speech. / Hafer, Catherine; Landa, Dimitri.

    In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3, 07.2007, p. 329-360.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Hafer, Catherine ; Landa, Dimitri. / Deliberation as self-discovery and institutions for political speech. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2007 ; Vol. 19, No. 3. pp. 329-360.
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