Deliberating collective decisions

Jimmy Chan, Alessandro Lizzeri, Wing Suen, Leeat Yariv

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date, agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main insights emerge from our analysis and are consistent with an array of stylized facts regarding committee decision making. First, majority rule is more vulnerable than super-majority rules to the disproportionate influence of impatient committee members. Second, more diverse preferences, more patient members, or more unanimous decision voting rules lead to lengthier deliberation and more accurate decisions. Finally, balanced committees unanimously prefer to delegate deliberation power to a moderate chairman rather than be governed by a rule such as unanimity.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)929-963
    Number of pages35
    JournalReview of Economic Studies
    Volume85
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 1 2018

    Fingerprint

    Majority rule
    Vote
    Deliberation
    Voting rules
    Chairmen
    Decision making
    Stylized facts
    Patient preferences
    Information acquisition
    Unanimity

    Keywords

    • Collective learning
    • Optimal stopping
    • Sequential likelihood ratio test
    • Swing voters

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Chan, J., Lizzeri, A., Suen, W., & Yariv, L. (2018). Deliberating collective decisions. Review of Economic Studies, 85(2), 929-963. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx028

    Deliberating collective decisions. / Chan, Jimmy; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Suen, Wing; Yariv, Leeat.

    In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 85, No. 2, 01.04.2018, p. 929-963.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Chan, J, Lizzeri, A, Suen, W & Yariv, L 2018, 'Deliberating collective decisions', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 929-963. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx028
    Chan J, Lizzeri A, Suen W, Yariv L. Deliberating collective decisions. Review of Economic Studies. 2018 Apr 1;85(2):929-963. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx028
    Chan, Jimmy ; Lizzeri, Alessandro ; Suen, Wing ; Yariv, Leeat. / Deliberating collective decisions. In: Review of Economic Studies. 2018 ; Vol. 85, No. 2. pp. 929-963.
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