Deception in simple voting games

Steven Brams, Frank C. Zagare

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The calculations of sophisticated voters who successively eliminate undesirable strategies are analyzed in three-person voting games in which one voter with complete information can, as a deceiver, induce the other two voters with incomplete information to vote in such a way as to ensure a better outcome than the deceiver could ensure in a game of complete information. Deception which is "tacit," wherein a deceiver votes consistently with his announced preference scale, is distinguished from deception which is "revealed," wherein a deceiver's action deviates from his announced preference scale. Among the conclusions drawn from the study is that revealed deception is generally a more potent tool than tacit deception in securing a more-preferred outcome, and deception opportunities are greater the more disagreement there is among the nondeceivers.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)257-272
    Number of pages16
    JournalSocial Science Research
    Volume6
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1977

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Education
    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Deception in simple voting games. / Brams, Steven; Zagare, Frank C.

    In: Social Science Research, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1977, p. 257-272.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Brams, Steven ; Zagare, Frank C. / Deception in simple voting games. In: Social Science Research. 1977 ; Vol. 6, No. 3. pp. 257-272.
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