Credibility in compliance and punishment

Leader specific punishments and credibility

Fiona McGillivray, Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The ability of nation A to compel nation B to grant it concessions depends upon the credibility with which A can commit to punish B for noncompliance. Discarding traditional unitary actor approaches, we assume policy in each nation is set by mortal political leaders and model the compliance/punishment relation between A and B in a noisy infinitely repeated setting. If nations utilize leader specific punishment, that is target policies against leaders rather than the nations they represent, then leaders improve the credibly of their threats to punish noncompliance since citizens have incentives to depose leaders to restore national integrity.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)248-258
    Number of pages11
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume68
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 2006

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    credibility
    penalty
    leader
    concession
    integrity
    incentive
    threat
    citizen
    ability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Credibility in compliance and punishment : Leader specific punishments and credibility. / McGillivray, Fiona; Smith, Alastair.

    In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 2, 05.2006, p. 248-258.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    McGillivray, Fiona ; Smith, Alastair. / Credibility in compliance and punishment : Leader specific punishments and credibility. In: Journal of Politics. 2006 ; Vol. 68, No. 2. pp. 248-258.
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