Corruption in Committees

An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting

Rebecca B. Morton, Jean Robert Tyran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that nonexperts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee decision-making. However, if the probability of corrupt experts is large, the effect is not sufficient to offset the mechanical effect of decreased information efficiency due to corrupt experts. Our results demonstrate that the norm of "letting the expert decide" in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a limited extent, a positive effect on information efficiency.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)553-579
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume17
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015

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aggregation
corruption
voting
expert
efficiency
Experimental study
Voting
Information aggregation
Corruption
decision making
Information efficiency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Corruption in Committees : An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting. / Morton, Rebecca B.; Tyran, Jean Robert.

In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2015, p. 553-579.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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