Corporate influence and the regulatory mandate

Sanford Gordon, Catherine Hafer

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    Industries face collective action and commitment problems when attempting to influence Congress. At the same time, an individual firm's political investments can yield reduced bureaucratic scrutiny by indicating that firm's willingness to contest agency decisions. We develop a model in which the desirability of maintaining a political footprint for this reason enables individual firms to commit to rewarding elected officials who maintain laws benefiting an entire industry. Our "dual forbearance" model anticipates that corporate political investments will be larger on average when statutes are stringent and that even pro-industry legislative coalitions will benefit politically from the existence of a minimal regulatory state.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)300-319
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume69
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 2007

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    industry
    collective behavior
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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Corporate influence and the regulatory mandate. / Gordon, Sanford; Hafer, Catherine.

    In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 2, 05.2007, p. 300-319.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Gordon, Sanford ; Hafer, Catherine. / Corporate influence and the regulatory mandate. In: Journal of Politics. 2007 ; Vol. 69, No. 2. pp. 300-319.
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