Coordination of co-investments in supply chain infrastructure

Konstantin Kogan, Charles Tapiero

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper considers co-investments in a supply chain infrastructure using an inter-temporal investment model. We assume that the supply chain firms' capital consists essentially of an investment in the supply chain's infrastructure. As a result, firms' policies consist in selecting both an optimal level of employment and the level of co-investment in the supply chain infrastructure. Recent papers by Kogan and Tapiero (Eur J Oper Res 2009; Supply chain games: Operations management and risk valuation. Springer, Boston 2007) have presented open-loop and feedback solutions for non-cooperating firms and have shown that these solutions differ from a unique system-wide optimal solution, which maximizes the overall supply chain profit. To overcome this problem and thereby improve the supply chain performance, this paper suggests a coordination approach. Such an approach is consistent with a recent practice which consists in the creation of a supply chain shared capital (or joint funding of selected activities) with a temporal reward (or penalties) offered to non-cooperating firms for each dollar investment they make. In addition, this paper provides a closed form expression for the time sensitive rewards function expressed in terms of the system parameters. We show that when these rewards are offered, the Nash co-investment equilibrium is equal to the system-wide optimal solution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2471-2475
Number of pages5
JournalJournal of Intelligent Manufacturing
Volume23
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2012

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Keywords

  • Control
  • Coordination
  • Investment analysis
  • Supply chain management

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

Cite this

Coordination of co-investments in supply chain infrastructure. / Kogan, Konstantin; Tapiero, Charles.

In: Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Vol. 23, No. 6, 12.2012, p. 2471-2475.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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